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Abstrak 
Untuk menjawab kecenderungan ilmu-ilmu modern yang menciutkan 
segala sesuatu kepada hal-hal yang material, Michael Polanyi 
menawarkan sebuah alternatif pemahaman realitas. Menurut Polanyi, ada 
hirarki kenyataan. Suatu realitas dari tingkat yang lebih tinggi tidak dapat 
direduksi pada tingkat yang lebih rendah. Misalnya, kesadaran tidak dapat 
dijelaskan dengan hukum-hukum fisika dan kimia yang terjadi pada otak. 
Pengetahuan menyeluruh tentang setiap bagian dari suatu kenyataan, 
tidak dapat menjelaskan keseluruhan kenyataan tersebut. Dalam cahaya 
pemahaman kenyataan seperti itu Polanyi membela adanya realitas 
metafisis dan spiritual yang harus diakui bila martabat manusia ingin 
dihormati. 
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Introduction 
Science tends to explain realities in the framework of one-level world, that 
is in terms of material things. Modern science has successfully restricted our 
interest within the context of mechanical language. Everything is to be 
explained as mere materials. Even consciousness has to be understood in this 
framework. In this perspective there is no place for any metafisical and spiritual 
aspect. This, for Michael Polanyi, is unacceptable. He opposes this position by 
presenting a different feature of realities. Using his idea of knowledge, the tacit 
knowledge, Polanyi arrives at the idea of a many–level world. Reality is seen in 
a hierarchical structure, which implies that a reality of a higher level cannot be 
totally explained in terms of its particulars. The process of evolution is also 
understood in this perspective. For in every phase of evolution there exists a 
new principle which is not present in its precedent phase. In the light of this 
idea the reality is far more rich than just described in the materialistic doctrine. 
For Polanyi, real thing means something which has the capacity to reveal itself 
indeterminately in the future. The most important label of reality then, is its 
deep aspects, its potential manifestations, which are ready to be discovered and, 
if discovered, will open possibilities for further discoveries. 
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Within this idea of reality an acceptance of a metaphysical reality is now 
possible.1 The metaphysical reality has to be seen in the framework of the 
emergence of the higher entity from the lower one that brings us to the rising of 
a living thing capable of pursuing the universal intent and feeling responsible. 
Such universal intents are something that scientists, who admire the pure 
objectivity and detachment, have to get rid of. 
In this article I present Polanyi’s approach to this subject. His 
anti-reductionistic position is shown as an integral part of his intent to recover 
the dignity of man attacked by the materialistic interpretation of reality. So, 
after explaining the hierarchy of reality I highlight its relevancy to demonstrate 
the greatness of human dignity. Finally, I present my investigation of how such 
an idea leads to an acknowledgement of the metaphysical reality. The works in 
the notes without the name of the author are all Polanyi’s works. 
 
The Hierarchy of Reality 
The structure of tacit knowing according to Polanyi,  tells us something 
about reality.2 Within this frame the world can be understood as a “universe 
filled with strata of realities, joined together meaningfully in pairs of higher and 
lower strata.” 3  In the light of this view Polanyi understands life as an 
emergence requiring the involvement of a higher principle more than merely 
physics and chemistry. He showed that the laws of physics and chemistry in 
themselves fail to explain the emergence of life. It is even more obvious in 
conscious being, especially in man endowed with universal intent. Polanyi’s 
aim is to show the fallacy of reductionistic view which presents reality as a 
one–level world and explains everything in terms of the laws of physics and 
chemistry, in terms of material in motion. With this discernment he is ready to 
show the greatness of human being and to recognise the metaphysical reality. 
 
The Many-Level World 
Through his elaboration of the strata of realities, Polanyi gives a fresh 
understanding of a many–level world. It is an ontological explanation based on 
his theory of knowledge. With this explanation he shows the fallacy of the 
reductionism which tends to explain everything in a one–level framework. 
There is a strata of realities, he argues. Though the lower level provides a 
necessary condition for the existence of a higher level, the higher level  cannot 
be totally explained in terms of the lower one.  There is a boundary condition 
and a principle of marginal control operating in an emergence of a new level of 
                                                 
1In Polanyi’s thought metaphysical reality includes all the targets of our ideal 
statements, such as truth, justice and morality. They are all realities that cannot be 
reduced, as done by the current science, to physics and chemistry, and ultimately to 
forces acting between atomic particles. 
2The Tacit Dimension, 34. 
3The Tacit Dimension, 35. 
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existence. This discernment leads us to the idea of the teleological orientation of 
things. 
 
Against Reductionism 
Under the admiration of a detached and objective knowledge as the ideal 
knowledge, there is a craze for holding a reductionistic view of reality. Such is 
the trend prevailing in our time especially in science which claims that 
everything can be exhaustively explained without referring to any aspect of 
reality which is unverified by science. Polanyi reminds us of the danger of such 
an idea. It is claimed that science  has to talk about real things; while real, in 
such ideas, exclusively means demonstrable and measurable. This claim is 
prompted by the view of a one–level world, that everything ought to be 
explained in terms of physical and chemical structure. We are now dominated 
largely by the strong feeling that what is really true is the universe of atoms and 
motion. There is a tendency to admire physics and chemist as the ideal approach 
to reality.4 
Polanyi sees the Laplacean vision as a model of the most ambitious 
reductionism. According to Laplace a complete knowledge of the universe can 
be gained through the knowledge of primary qualities containing of the masses, 
positions, velocities, and forces of ultimate particles.5 This left us not just a 
very cold idea of reality in a mechanical reductionism, but also an impossible 
one. The knowledge of particulars of a comprehensive entity cannot provide us 
with the exact knowledge of the entity. This is the very core of Polanyi’s 
argument against reductionism which tries to explain everything in terms of 
physics and chemistry.6 
Polanyi takes machines as illustration of his position.7 In the concept of a 
machine there involves a certain purpose that does not present in its material 
particulars. There involves also the operational principle that cannot be 
explained in terms of physics and chemistry. They are the important factors in 
machine which do not derive from physics and chemistry. Hence there are some 
additional principles. Physics and chemistry, at the most, prepare potential 
elements to be used as particulars for a joint purpose but not determine it. This 
                                                 
4Personal Knowledge, 6. 
5Meaning, 25; and in 29 Polanyi writes: “Laplace affirmed that if we knew at one 
moment of time the exact positions and velocities of every particles of matter in the 
universe, as well as the forces acting between the particles, we could compute the 
positions and velocities of the same particles at any other date, whether past or future. 
To amind thus equipped, all things to come and all things past would stand equally 
revealed. Such is the complete knowledge of the universe as conceived by Laplace.” 
The context of this quotation is Polanyi’s objection against the position held in science 
that scientific knowledge has to get rid of every kind of personal participation. 
6Personal Knowledge, 329 
7D. SCOTT, Michael Polanyi. A Clear and Lively Account of His Ideas, London 
1996, 115. 
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is an example which describes the fundamental understanding of a hierarchy of 
reality rather than a one–level one as held by the reductionistic view.8 
Biology is one of the significant domain that is so largely and intensively 
dominated by the influential reductionism. There is a great tendency to explain 
even the reality of life in terms of physics and chemistry.9 
Indeed, there is reason why such an assumption has to be considered as 
non-sense. Polanyi’s arguments against such an idea can be shown through the 
logical consequences that leads such an assumption to a meaningless 
affirmation. If every thing has to be reduced to the forces acting between atomic 
particles, then nothing else can be claimed to be meaningful. No life, no arts, no 
human being, no works of man can still exist against such an idea. Neither the 
idea itself can escape from such a program of elimination. If reality is no more 
than physical and chemical process, then every claim about reality is to be 
shattered immediately, for it cannot escape from the trap which it builds. Of 
course, it is inconceivable to think that the Hallelujah of Händel was no more 
than the interaction of atoms and physical necessity. It is so strange to consider 
it as the result of accident and necessity as Jacques Monod holds.10 
The main ambition of reductionism in science today is to present reality in 
terms of ever more minute and minimal number of entities. Accordingly, we 
know ontological reductionism which claims that there is but one substance or 
world stuff and that this is material. There is also methodological reductionism 
which claims that researchers should always look for explanations at the lowest 
levels of theoretical description, ultimately at the level of atoms and molecules 
or other elementary particles that make up the objects being studied.11 There is 
no doubt, Polanyi admits, that such a reductionistic explanation at certain sense 
                                                 
8Personal Knowledge, 329. 
9Meaning, 25. 
10Jacques Monod admired the notion of antique Atomism expressed by Democritus 
who said, that everything in the universe was but the result of accident and necessity. 
Monod accepted scientific method as the only approach which gives the true knowledge 
of nature. While its method requires objectivity and demonstrability of the object, he 
refutes every idea of a final cause, let alone the idea of project. This position is based on 
his assumption of the objectivity. He holds that, outside the mathematics, purely formal, 
a true knowledge can be acquired only through observation and scientific experiment. 
This idea is obviously untenable, for it is  based neither on mathematics nor 
observation or experiment. (See M. LECLERC, Il destino umano nella luce di Blondel, 
Assisi 1993, 160.) 
11T. HONDERICH, ed., The Oxford Companion to Philosophy, Oxford – New 
York 1995. In this work reductionism is devided in three division: “Ontological 
reductionism refers to the belief that the whole of reality consists of a minima number 
of entities or substances [...] often the claim is meant in the more metaphysical sense 
that there is but one substance or “world stuff” and that this is material”. 
“Methodological reductionism claims that, in science, “small is beautiful”. Thus the 
best scientific strategy is always to attempt explanation in terms of ever more minute 
entities.”; see also F.J. TIPLER, The Physics of Immortality. Modern Cosmology. God 
and the Resurrection of the Dead, New York 1995, 294-299. 
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helps us to understand reality. Nevertheless, it has been noted how the intensive 
attention focused on particulars destroys our comprehension of its focal 
meaning.12 Polanyi then seems to say that in our knowledge of a comprehensive 
entity, embodying a rule of rightness, any information supplied by physics and 
chemistry can play only a subsidiary role. 
Philosophical thought of Polanyi is motivated on humanitarian grounds. 
Accordingly, his objection against reductionism has to be considered in this 
context rather than merely as an interest of a more satisfying speculation. 
Reductionism, in his opinion, is the source of so many human sufferings in our 
time. It is the cause of our corruption of the idea of man, reducing him either to 
an insentient automaton or to a bundle of appetites. That is why science denies 
us the possibility of acknowledging personal responsibility and why science can 
be invoked so easily in support of totalitarian violence.13 
The obsession for experiential facts which are measurable and observable 
prompts scientists to get rid of every kind of metaphysical reality and religious 
dogma. Polanyi openly accuses the Viennese school as the supporter of such 
fallacies. 14  In such a positivistic view there is no ground for an ethical 
statement. “No conceivable occurrence, no measurement or observation, can 
decide whether any action is moral or immoral, just or unjust, good or evil.”15  
If so, how can we prove, in scientific terms, that saying a false testimony is 
wrong? How can we get the meaning when one protests or intervening to stop 
others from doing distressing things? 
Such a trend is adopted in the study of society, for example in 
anthropology, which describes social events in strictly scientific terms. The 
anthropologists then, in carrying out their analysis of society, are reluctant to 
imply the category of good and evil for they cannot be proved scientifically. In 
some anthropological explanations, for example, a cruel murder of supposed 
witches is explained as a cultural achievement and head–hunting as fulfilling an 
essential function in the societies in which they are practised.16 
In order to avoid the dangerous consequences to humanity spread by such 
an attitude in science, Polanyi insists, there is only one choice, that is the 
recognition of metaphysical reality, irreducible to material elements.17 Hence, 
the reality has to be understood in a new way which regards a multi–level world 
                                                 
12Personal Knowledge, 330. 
13Meaning, 25. 
14Meaning, 27. 
15Meaning, 27. 
16See Meaning, 26. Polanyi refers to Clyde Kluckhohn who says, that some social 
systems are much more efficient than others in directing aggression into oblique or 
non-disruptive channels. But there is no doubt, according to Kluckhohn, that witchcraft 
is Navaho culture’s principal answer to the problem that every society faces: how to 
satisfy hate and still keep the core of society solid. The same criticism is aimed at 
Gordon Childe who describes the motive of head–hunting in Eddystone Islanders in 
terms of a motive for living and keeping their economic system functioning. 
17Meaning, 24. 
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which in its turn shows the “existence of a value that is absent from the 
constituent particulars.”18 
 
The Strata of Realities 
In chapter two of his The Tacit Dimension, Polanyi asserts his ambition to 
show “a picture of the universe filled with strata of realities, joined together 
meaningfully in pairs of higher and lower strata.” 19  The same intention is 
expressed in the introduction to the part four of his Personal Knowledge.20 
Polanyi accepts the evolutionistic view of the world and living things, but he 
considers them not just as fruit of chance and accident. 
The hierarchy structure of a reality is evident in the structure of tacit 
knowing. In dealing with a coherent entity, we tacitly involve two terms. 
Polanyi calls these as two terms of an act of tacit knowing, namely the proximal 
term including the particulars, and the distal one that is the comprehensive 
meaning. The two terms, in Polanyi’s view, can be seen as two levels of reality 
controlled by distinctive principle. Between the first and the second term there 
is an asymmetric relation in the sense that the principles controlling the 
comprehensive entity ever rely for their operations on laws governing the 
particulars of the entity, while the laws governing the particulars in themselves 
will never explain the organising principle of the comprehensive entity which 
they form. It is for that reason that Polanyi calls the comprehensive meaning as 
the upper or higher entity and the particulars as the lower.21 
We can easily find examples for such a hierarchy of reality other than the 
example of the machine. A town planner, for example, relies on its successive 
lower levels. He relies, on the first place, on the architect, while the architect 
relies on the brickmaker’s work. Below the art of making bricks there serve the 
raw materials. So, a town planning contains at least four successive levels that 
correspond to four successive levels of rules. The raw materials of the bricks are 
governed by physics and chemistry; technology uses these laws to make bricks; 
architecture helps the builders; and the rules of town planning gives direction to 
the town planners. Polanyi gives another example, that is the giving of a speech. 
He demonstrates five levels in such an action each of them governed by its own 
laws. They are the production of voice, of words, of sentences, of style, and of 
literary composition; while their corresponding laws are phonetics, 
lexicography, grammar, stylistic, and literary criticism. 
These examples show us a hierarchy of comprehensive entities with their 
relation to the higher and to the lower level. The lower provides the possibility 
for the next higher levels, while the higher one gives shapes to the lower by 
controlling its principles. In the case of producing the speech we can say that 
the voice is shaped into words by vocabulary; in its turn vocabulary is shaped 
                                                 
18Personal Knowledge, 327. 
19The Tacit Dimension, 35. 
20Personal Knowledge, 327. 
21The Tacit Dimension, 34. 
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into sentences in accordance with grammar. The sentences can be fit into a style 
which in its turn is made to convey the ideas of a literary composition. 
Polanyi recognise here a dual control involving in each level, namely  first, 
the laws that apply to its elements in themselves and, second, the laws that 
control the comprehensive entity formed by them. The latter cannot be 
accounted for by the laws governing the first, for, as Polanyi writes, “the 
operations of a higher level cannot be accounted for by the laws governing its 
particulars.” The vocabulary cannot be derived from phonetics; the grammar of 
a language cannot be derived from vocabulary; while the correct use of the 
grammar of a language does not mean we speak or write in a good style. They 
belong to different levels, hence every level has certain operations that are 
absent in the lower entity. A higher entity, according to Polanyi, has a more 
complex structure than the lower one, for the lower plays but a subsidiary role 
in the whole. 
 
Boundary Condition and Principle of Marginal Control 
If a reality relies for its operation on the laws governing its particulars, how 
can it fail to be determined by these laws? If a machine has to obey the laws of 
physics and chemistry, how can it fail to be explained in terms of physics and 
chemistry? How can the details of voice fail to represent the whole reality of 
language? “Does it not follow then that it must be possible to represent all their 
workings in terms of these laws?”22 These questions are launched by Polanyi to 
show the limits of reductionist tendency of objectivism. The system of dual 
control is proposed by Polanyi to explain the relation between different levels of 
comprehensive entities or performances. Each level is controlled by both its 
own laws and those of the next level above. 
It has been said that the relation between these two levels is not 
symmetrical.23 This means, according to Polanyi, that the laws of each level of 
reality leave open certain limits within which they operate. Polanyi calls these 
limits the boundary conditions.24 In fact, he demonstrates in many ways the 
existence of an hierarchical organisation of being which he maintains ensued 
from pyramiding sets of boundary conditions.25 It is an original term of Polanyi 
which is very important in his understanding of knowledge and reality. The 
term is borrowed from physics but he gives it a wider meaning. He means with 
it a series of conditions left undetermined by the laws of nature. The 
determination of these undetermined laws can be imposed on matter by natural 
process or by artificial intervention. Accordingly, we can see different 
principles that apply to a variety of circumstances.  They can be a law of 
nature, as the laws of physics and chemistry, or be principles of operation, like 
those of machine and physiology. They can be also principles laid down for the 
                                                 
22Knowing and Being, 216. 
23See Personal Knowledge, 331. 
24See The Tacit Dimension, 40; see also Knowing and Being, 216-217. 
25H. PROSCH, Michael Polanyi.  A Critical Exposition, New York 1986, 132. 
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use of artefacts as we have in the use of a language or in the rules of chess.26 
Accordingly, an inanimate system can be subject to a dual control on two levels. 
In the case of the machine, for example, “the operations of the upper level are 
artificially embodied in the boundaries of the lower level which is relied on to 
obey the laws of inanimate nature, i.e., physics and chemistry.”27 
While the lower level leaves open its boundary conditions undetermined, 
the organisational principle of a higher one exercises on them a principle called 
by Polanyi the principle of marginal control. This principle controls the 
boundaries left undetermined by the next lower level. The production of voice, 
as the lowest level of speech, leaves largely open the possibility to be combined 
into words, which is controlled by a vocabulary. The vocabulary in its turn 
leaves largely open a boundary to be harnessed by the laws of grammar in 
creating sentences. That does not mean the laws of the lower level loose their 
role. Contrarily, Polanyi asserts, each lower level imposes restrictions on the 
one above it.28 
The laws of nature remains while it leave its boundary open. Exercising the 
principle of marginal control over this boundary can be done only by respecting 
the laws of nature or, more generally, the laws of the lower level.29 Man shapes 
the structure of machines and the working of their structure. Nevertheless, the 
material and the forces that operate them obey the laws of inanimate nature.30 
Every level of reality obeys the laws of its next lower level. It is made 
possible by these laws, and at the same time is given limits by the same laws. 
On the other hand, the principle of marginal control is something different to 
this level. It is imposed from outside for the purpose outside those laws31. The 
                                                 
26See Knowing and Being, 216. 
27The Tacit Dimension, 40. 
28The Tacit Dimension, 41; See also Knowing and Being, 41. Here Polanyi writes 
about the boundaries harnessing the laws of inanimate nature. He explains: “This 
harness is not unbreakable; the structure of the machine and with it its working can 
break down. But this will not affect the forces of inanimate nature on which the 
operation of the machine relied; it merely releases them from the restriction the machine 
imposed on them before it broke down.” 
29Knowing and Being, 41 
30Knowing and Being, 225. 
31There might be a confusion about the terminologies “boundary conditions” and 
the “principle of marginal control”. In The Tacit Dimension the two terminologies (the 
boundary conditions and the principle of marginal control) are described as belonging to 
different levels. Polanyi writes explicitly: “These principles [namely the principles of 
marginal control] may be said to govern the boundary conditions of an inanimate 
system—a set of conditions that is explicitly left undetermined by the laws of nature.” 
(40). This distinction is parallel with the description given in Knowing and Being: “[...] 
the boundary conditions of a principle are in fact subject to control by other principles. 
These I will call higher principles. Thus the boundary conditions of the laws of 
mechanics may be controlled by the operational principles which define a machine [...]” 
(217).  In the same work (225) he uses the ‘boundary conditions’ to describe the 
‘principle of marginal control’ as defined in The Tacit Dimension. He writes, for 
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laws of the lower level, though they remain in operation, are blind to this 
purpose, so that the higher entities are irreducible to them. Hence no description 
of a comprehensive entity in the light of its lower principles can ever reveal the 
operation of its higher principles.32 
 
Teleological Orientation of Things 
The idea of the orientation of things is one of the most strange idea for 
modern thought. Scientists feel obliged to get rid of such concept for it cannot 
be proved through the scientific method dominated by empiricism and 
positivism. It has been proclaimed by Democritus, that everything in the world 
is no more than as the result of chance and necessity.33 It means that the idea of 
a purposive world is necessarily excluded. Jacques Monod, of our age, takes the 
same position in his effort to replace the simple explanation of the world in 
terms of orientation and purpose in a mechanistic explanation. Natural 
phenomenon, in his opinion, can be explained in terms of mechanical cause 
without any reference to the “causa finale”.34 
The world described in such a way is, of course, a world without any 
meaning. It is a world which is no more than the collision of atoms and revolves 
around the mechanical events. The consequence of such a view is that the world 
is value–free as existentialists hold. Polanyi, on the contrary, realise the world 
as a meaningful one. In fact, his thought can be seen as a continuos struggle for 
recovering the meaning of the world and of human experience. He refers to the 
representative element in all religious orientation which portrays the world as 
meaningful.35 Here his idea of the particulars and the comprehensive entity or 
performance within the idea of the hierarchy of reality finds its application. He 
admires Socrates’ wise position holding that “the world cannot be thought of as 
ultimately meaningful unless the organization of its parts is meaningful, that is, 
unless there is some point to the way things are put together or, at least, to the 
direction in which they are developing [...] Some intelligible directional lines 
                                                 
example, as a title of one section: “Boundaries Harness the Laws of Inanimate Nature”. 
Again he adds: “We may borrow a term from physics and describe both these useful 
restrictions of nature as the imposing of boundary conditions on the laws of physics and 
chemistry.” (226). Here Polanyi does not make a distinction between the boundary 
conditions and the principles of marginal control. Nevertheless, I prefer to follow the 
distinctions defined in The Tacit Dimension, for it gives us a clear idea of the hierarchy 
of realities, that is that the boundary conditions belong to the lower level left 
undetermined, while the principles of marginal control belong to the higher that gives 
the determination to the boundaries. 
32Knowing and Being, 217. 
33 In Democritus cosmology, a chance concentration of atoms in empty space 
begins a circular motion impelled by collisions. The motion becomes a vortex surround 
by spherical membrane, whithin which a cosmos, or world, is formed. (See MAUTNER 
T., ed., A Dictionary of Philosophy, Oxford 1996, 97-98.) 
34See M. LECLERC, Il destino umano nella luci di Blondel, Assisi 1993, 60-61. 
35Meaning, 161. 
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must be thought to be operative in it.”36 It is, indeed, a principle foreign to 
physical and chemical interactions.  
Accordingly, a meaningful world has to be thought of as something more 
than just as the result of an orderly and rational interaction of forces. 
Anaxagoras seems to take a different position when he says that the material 
elements—namely air, ether, and water—were the cause of all things, although 
he had claimed to show how Mind was the arranger and cause of all things. 
Polanyi refers to Socrates’ disappointment against such a view that ascribes no 
causal power in the ordering of things.37 
Indeed, the recognition of order in the universe is insufficient to find the 
world meaningful. Polanyi has an abundance of example to show it even from 
our modern time. The view that the world is absurd, he argues, cannot be held 
as a consequence of the idea that the elements in it are not orderly related to one 
another. Such an orderly relation is in fact easily observed. So, Polanyi writes: 
“We think the world is absurd because it seems to us that there is no point to 
what transpires in it, i.e., that there is no end or aim or purpose to the whole 
business. It seems to us that there is no meaning to the universe—except 
possibly the subjective meaning that man tries to import into it.”38  It is of 
course a tragic world, for if the meaning was no more than subjective, the 
universe will cancel it out. 
The sharp opposition between science and religion prevailing in our 
contemporary mind cannot be separated from the fact of how science sees the 
idea of a teleological view of the cosmos. It started with the scientific 
explanation in a reductionistic base explaining the world as merely atomic 
elements acting blindly in terms of equilibriums and forces.  According to  
Polanyi, it is the source of every suspicion against the ideal that leads to the 
accusation as unscientific and woolgathering every sort of teleological view of 
the cosmos.39 
Some new philosophical movements which launch the opposition to 
science still inherit the anti–teleological idea from science. Polanyi accuses, for 
example, existentialism as an attempt to oppose any sort of cosmic purpose on 
the ground of its demand for freedom and antideterminism. A purpose and 
determination, in the language of existentialism, means a limitation of freedom, 
so in the sphere of the freedom of men, there must be no fixed purpose.40 
                                                 
36Meaning, 161. 
37Meaning, 161; See also F. COPLESTON, A History of Philosophy, I, Doubleday, 
New York 1993, 71. 
38Meaning, 161-162. 
39Meaning, 162. 
40A purpose can be understood if there is a subject who establishes it. In Sartre’s 
view the idea of human and cosmic purpose is related to the idea of God, so the idea of 
freedom requires an atheistic consequence. In the absence of God, who created man for 
a purpose or a deteminate goal, he argues, man is free to follow his choice. Man is free 
for, in such a situation, there is no given moral order to which man can appeal to justify 
his choice. The idea of determinism then has no place for him. See J.-P. SARTRE, 
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According to Polanyi, admitting a teleological aspect of the universe does 
not necessarily suppose a complete determination of every structure and 
occurrence in the universe. However, the objection of materialistic and 
mechanistic atomism lies in this point. Polanyi, therefore, especially thanks 
Charles S. Peirce and William James for their offering against what he calls a 
looser view of teleology.41 He notes we are now ready to suppose a presence of 
some sort of intelligible directional tendencies operative in the world without 
supposing they determine all things.42 He sees also Whitehead’s view modelled 
on Plato’s idea of  “Good” as a support to such a position. Whatever they call 
it, those who hold a teleological orientation of things in the world suppose an 
external principle working in the chain of events.43 
This should be an alternative to the polarities between the views of the 
blind mechanical necessity and total freedom. However, Polanyi is disappointed 
that such an alternative solution has hardly an echo in our contemporary minds. 
We in the modern world, he notes, seem used to the opposed polarities, and 
accordingly to the notion that the world is simply absurd and hence the idea of a 
teleological orientation has no meaning. 
The idea of the evolution of living organism is one of the most influential 
views responsible for the denial of a purposeful world. Since Darwin, the 
mechanical explanation of the species dominates any other explanation. The 
idea of purpose is then reduced to the terms of natural selection, and biology 
incessantly provides us with mechanical explanation of the life process by 
reducing it to chemical and physical interactions. It is clear that Polanyi regrets 
also the completely behavioristic approach to animal and human psychology 
which admires only the empirical data of a behavior without recurring to its 
deeper dimensions. In their discussion of animal and even human behaviour, 
behaviourists wish to abandon every idea of purpose or aim. For them the idea 
of teleological orientation seems to be a dirty and unscientific word.44 
Polanyi recalls the situation before these aggressive tendencies, when the 
“teleology” had not become a dirty word such as in our time. At that time, 
writes Polanyi, “living organisms, at least, seemed to be purposeful in their 
organisation (an integrated structure of functioning organs and tissues) and in 
                                                 
L’existentialisme est un Humanisme, Paris 1954, 36-37. Using Dostoïewsky’s words, he 
writes: “Si Dieu n’existait pas, tout serait permis.’ C’est là le point de départ de 
l’existentialisme. Un effet, tout est permis si Dieu n’existe pas, et par conséquent 
l’homme est délaissé, parce qu’il ne trouve ni en lui, ni hors de lui une possibilité de 
s’accrocher. Il ne trouve d’abord pas d’excuses. Si, en effet, l’existence précède 
l’essence, on ne pourra jamais expliquer par référence à une nature humaine donnée et 
figée; autrement dit, il n’y pas de déterminisme, l’homme est libre, l’homme est 
liberté.” 
41See Meaning, 162 
42See Meaning, 162 
43Meaning, 163. 
44Meaning, 162. 
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their operations and their ecology as well.”45 He admits that such a view is 
considered today as an absurd idea, so that any attempt to re–establish the idea 
of a purposeful world has to deal with the very core of the problem, namely the 
claim of physics and chemistry. For that purpose, Polanyi continues his 
argument by analizing the presence of life. 
 
The Presence of Life 
The ambition of modern science to explain everything in materialistic terms 
finds its culmination in its effort to reduce life and consciousness to merely 
facts of physics and chemistry. Modern science has successfully restricted our 
interest within the context of mechanical language. According to Michael 
Polanyi, this is the core of the refutation of any sort of purposeful orientation.46 
He does not deny the importance of those elements in living things. In fact our 
knowledge of them help us to understand the process of life and to deal with 
certain aspects of its failure. What he refutes is the restriction of life in terms of 
physics and chemistry.47 
 
Machine–Like Explanation of Living Things 
The fact that the process of life relies for its operation on the laws of 
physics and chemistry has prompted some biologists to accept a machine–like 
explanation of living things. For them, an organism is no more than a 
sophisticated and complex machine that can be, sooner or later, reduced to a 
physical and chemical explanation.48 Such an assumption applies also to reality 
possessed by living things such as consciousness. For Polany it is a pity, that 
such an explanation is taken for granted by most intelligent opinions today. 
Encouraged by the fact that some “intelligent” machines can substitute human 
performances, and even do it more effectively, we are now ready to assume that 
one day human being can be substituted by machines, and that whole aspect of 
living things will be controlled and determined by science and technology. 
Polanyi opposes this assumption for two reasons. First, for such a notion is 
dangerous, since it contains a logical basis for the lack of respect for life and for 
human beings possessing a responsible choice.49 If life is no more than the 
chemical interactions, then there is no reason to demand respect in its name. 
Second, he refutes such a claim for the fact that it does not represent a true 
understanding of the hierarchy of reality. Even a machine cannot be explained 
exhaustively in terms of physics and chemistry.50 There is a principle foreign to 
                                                 
45Meaning, 163. 
46Meaning, 163-164. 
47The Tacit Dimension, 41-42. 
48Knowing and Being, 219. 227; Personal Knowledge, 336. 
49See The Study of Man, 46. 
50In Knowing and Being, Polanyi admits the comparableness of machines and 
organism in order to show that the presence of life requires a foreign higher principle to 
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physics and chemistry operative in a machine.51 
There are indeed aspects in biology which are beyond the scope of physics 
and chemistry. 52  It has been noted that the boundary condition is always 
something beyond the process which it delimits. “Thus the morphology of 
living things transcends the laws of physics and chemistry.”53 Polanyi explains 
this position by referring the capacity of organism in dealing with a multi 
complex situation observed by certain scientists.54 
In Polanyi’s view, those observations show that life cannot be reduced to 
mechanical process no matter how complex the process may be.55 He insists 
that physics and chemistry know nothing about conscious efforts and feelings 
that in many cases accompany the activities of living beings. Indeed, there is a 
claims that even sentience can be explained in terms of certain 
                                                 
material elements. “In this light the organism is shown to be, like a machine, a system 
which works according to two different principles: its structure serves as a boundary 
condition harnessing the physical chemical process by which its organs perform their 
functions. Thus, this system may be called a system under dual control. Morphogenesis, 
the process by which the structure of living beings develops, can then be likened to the 
shaping of a machine which will act as boundary for the laws of inanimate nature. For 
just as these laws serve the machine, so they serve also the developed organism.” (227); 
in page 176 he writes: “[...] even if phisics and chemistry could be derived from 
predictions of atomic topography, the existence of the machines could not be stated, let 
alone accounted for, in these terms. And, accordingly, the knowledge of engineering 
[...] and of all problems of engineering, as well as of inventions and arguments 
conducted in terms of engineering, would be absent in a knowledge of the physical and 
chemical topography of the universe, and, a fortiori, in its atomic topography”. In 
Meaning, 169, he explains: “One thing obvious about mechanisms is that each one of 
them has acquired its organization by reference to some aim or goal or purpose that is to 
be achieved by it. That this purpose is not something deducible from the physical and 
chemical laws that operate its parts can easily be seen by the fact that, although we may 
be well versed in these laws, we cannot, through the mere physical and chemical study 
of even simple machines, such as manual tools, tell what the tool is for.”  
51The Tacit Dimension, 42. 
52Knowing and Being, 218-219. 
53Knowing and Being, 227. 
54Personal Knowledge, 336. 
55See also G. BASTI, Filosofia dell’uomo, edizioni Studio Domenicano 1995, 113. 
Gianfanco Basti , shows that the natural science helps us to describe life. However such 
a description does not explain the whole process of life. With the help of the natural 
science alone, we will never arrive at a scientific definition of life, for life does not 
belong to fisical and matematical level. “Quella che abbiamo finora tentato descrivendo 
la vita con l’ausilio delle scienze naturali [...] è dunque una semplice “charatterizzazione 
scientifica della scientifica della vita” [...] con l’aiuto delle sole scienze naturali, 
fisico–matematiche, non si potrà mai arrivare ad una “definizione scientifica” della vita 
perché, la “vita” in quanto termine astratto per in concreto “vivere” [...] non è una 
nozione di scienza naturale, bensì di metafisica. Con “vita” si intende infatti 
metafisicamente una delle perfezioni trascendentali dell’atto d’essere di una 
determinata classe di sostanze, I viventi appunto, sia in quanto enti fisici che spirituali.” 
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physico–chemical system so as to produce a conscious machine. However, 
suppose a machine develops to a conscious thinking, it immediately loses its 
machine–like character. An automatic operation has no influence on its 
outcome. Within this perspective, it is too bizarre, Polanyi tends to say, to 
suppose Shakespeare’s writings and plays as the results of an automatic 
mechanism. Neither can we imagine Hamlet as a result of automatic process.56 
Polanyi does not dare acknowledge the presence of an active centre 
operating unspecifiably in all animals which for some can be seen as vitalism. 
However, he does not mean that science has nothing to say about life. He admits 
that the organs of the body works like machines involving a series of a 
hierarchy of mechanical principles. 57  For that reason, there is no need to 
overlook the success of biology in explaining living functions. He merely 
reminds us, as Henry Bergson does, that the success of that kind “must not 
obscure the fact that these advances only add to the features of life which cannot 
be represented in terms of laws manifested in the realm of inanimate nature.”58 
Polanyi then feels confident in insisting that physics will never give us the key 
to life. 
 
Morphogenetic Regulation 
There are of course biologists who deny that living function can be 
represented in terms of engineering and technology. For them the process of life 
has a totally different characters. They call it organismic process. Polanyi loves 
to cite their example in his effort to show living function as a higher degree of 
reality. Such organismic process are found at work in regeneration, and are most 
strikingly demonstrated by the embryonic regeneration discovered by Hans 
Driesch. 59  Embryonic development is led by a spontaneous adaptive 
reorganisation to achieve its predetermined end even under profoundly modified 
conditions. 
The most amazing process is the capacity of one part of the embryo of 
certain lower animal of regenerating the whole embryo and at the end a normal 
individual. Hans Driesch discovered such a capacity in the embryo of sea 
urchin. He found that throughout several amputations any cell or combination 
of cell separated from embryo developed successfully into a normal sea urchin. 
He described this capacity as a harmonious equipotential. Polanyi describes 
it—as it is known in biology—as morphogenetic regulation.60 Such a potential 
improvisation in resolving problems in order to achieve a fixed end is, for 
Polanyi, a capacity beyond the explanation of physics and chemistry. 
The morphogenetic equipotentiality can be enlarged to the heuristic process 
of resolving problem or computing a predetermined end. Polanyi shows with 
                                                 
56Personal Knowledge, 336. 
57Personal Knowledge, 337. 
58The Tacit Dimension, 42. 
59The Tacit Dimension, 42. 
60See Personal Knowledge, 338. 
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this the presence of a creative centre in living beings which more clearly 
manifests in the activity of consciousness. 61  He refuses Gestalt claim that 
perceptual shaping and biological regulation are but the result of physical 
equilibration.62 
It has been said that even the most complex machine cannot produce 
originality manifested by the lowest living things. Originality is characteristic 
for living things operating equipotentially in dealing with unexpected and 
various situation or circumstances. Tacit knowing is seen by Polanyi as the 
manifestation of the equipotentiality. It integrates particulars hitherto unrelated 
things into a comprehensive entity for the solution we have in mind. We have to 
classify to this process the composition of a new poem, the invention of a 
machine, or the making a scientific discovery. They all need the capacity of 
reorganising available indeterminate means for achieving a comprehensive 
feature that we deem to be right.63 
The equipotential creativity cannot be shown by machine, hence it cannot 
be reduced to physico–chemical interactions. Inanimate nature has nothing to 
say about achievement and about sentience.64 Whatever the result may be, one 
                                                 
61Personal Knowledge, 339. 
62The Tacit Dimension, 43. 
63
 Polanyi refers to the observation of K.S. Lashley that mutilated rats, which had 
learned a maze, continue to find their way through it, though the neural paths used in 
learning had been cut. Admittedly, the manner of their progression was completely 
different. Nonetheless, each of them maneges an errorless run and, at the end, finds the 
food. Renoir’s experience gives a more amazing story. Renoir was a painter before he 
became crippled with arthritis. After this bad luck he lost the use of his feet and hands. 
Yet his capacity in painting continued for another twenty years until his death and 
produced pictures hardly distinguishable from the period when his hands were normal. 
At that period he continued on painting with a brush fixed to his forearm. Polanyi 
concludes from this story that “the skill and the vision which he had developed and 
mastered by the use of his fingers, was no longer in his fingers. It had become a 
knowledge and purpose of a highly abstract, totally unspecifiable kind: a purpose which 
could evoke from his mutilated body a set of implementations that were equipotential to 
his previous performance.” (Personal Knowledge, 337.) 
64The Tacit Dimension, 44; in Knowing and Being, 230, Polanyi argues also against 
the claim that the identification of DNA, considered to convey the heredity features of 
living things from generation to generation, gives proves to the reduction of living 
process to physical and chemical process. He writes: “We conclude that in each 
embryonic cell there is present the duplicate of a DNA molecule having a linear 
arrangement of its bases–an arrangement which, being independent of the chemical 
forces within the DNA molecules, conveys a rich amount of meaningful information. 
And we see that when this information is shaping the growing embryo, it produces in it 
boundary conditions which, themselves being independent of the physical chemical 
forces in which they are rooted, control the mechanism of life in the developed 
organism.” The similar argument is given also in his Meaning, 167: “But since we are 
unable, from the structure of the DNA, to predict their existence chemically, we must 
admit that we do not yet have the reduction of living process to physical and chemical 
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thing is clear, namely, there is an insistent effort to achieve its goal. This goal, 
according to Polanyi, must have value inexplicable in terms of the process 
having no such value.65 
 
Basic Form of Commitment 
In the light of Polanyi’s idea of knowledge as a process by which we deal 
with the reality, we then have the largest sense of knowledge as to cover also 
perception and action. This helps us to understand Polanyi’s idea that a kind of 
commitment is present in living beings especially in action and perception.66 
According to Polanyi, it is easy to see the presence of commitment in 
action and perception. We know that animals eat something in order to satisfy 
their hungry; they drink to satisfy their thirst. Moreover, in seeing an object our 
retinas undergo a continuous accommodation according to variable distances. 
Nonetheless, we see the object in a constant size, for we endorse the 
affirmations implied in it, namely that the object does in fact remain of constant 
size. “We have met here some primitive form of commitment, and biology has 
been revealed as an appreciation of commitment. To swallow something in the 
hope that it may be wholesome is clearly a commitment, and so is every act of 
seeing things is one particular way.”67 
The degree of commitments, according to Polanyi, is, of course, relative to 
the increasing of consciousness performed by the individual being. First, it is 
shown in a primordial manner of vegetative life, and going on one step higher it 
operates in a primitive state of perception, and eventually we see a responsible 
commitment in human being.68 
The different levels of commitments assign a various possibility of success 
or going wrong in the striving of individuals to achieve a potential end. “Only 
living things can make mistakes. Only living things can fail—or succeed.”69 
Hydrochloric acid can never fail to dissolve zinc and platinum, while the 
striving of a paramecium for living and reproducing may succeed or fail. In the 
active–perceptive level the risk and the meaningful ends are enriched with the 
                                                 
laws that modern biologists seem to think we can have. [...] We not only have not 
proved that these adaptive aspects of the DNA’s building capacity can be reduced 
wholly to physical and chemical operations, but we never can do so. In Personal 
Knowledge, 362, Polanyi argues that the correct and mistaken decision are attributed to 
the presence of a rational centre in the animal. 
65The Tacit Dimension, 44. Knowing and Being, 230: “Hence the existence of dual 
control in machines and living mechanisms represents a discontinuity between 
machines and living things on the one hand, so that both machines and living 
mechanisms are irreducible to the laws of physics and chemistry.” 
66Action, by being deliberate, is understood as different from the mere functioning 
of organs, while perception means the process of getting to know an external object by 
the impression made by it on our senses. (See Personal Knowledge, 361). 
67Personal Knowledge, 363. 
68Personal Knowledge, 363. 
69Meaning, 170. 
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possibility to do right and to know truly. At this level the organism is guided by 
instinct and drives in launching its action to fulfil its need. It can err but it is not 
determined.70  Its aim is to achieve its subjective satisfaction as a potential 
achievement. 
The striving for a potential achievement or potential meaning in human 
thought has a new aspect.71 The goal of striving in this level is not limited to the 
fulfilment of biological and perceptive need, but reaches also the problem and 
discovery. Mind experiences a tension of a problem and strives to resolve it 
under the guide of a belief of a potential meaning  which one thinks are 
accessible. More precisely, it strives to comprehend reality that it believes to be 
comprehensible although it is not yet comprehended. The risk to fail is followed 
by the promise of success. If it succeeds, it will be satisfied, and if it fails it is 
disappointing. According to Polanyi the choices are not made at random rather 
controlled by the pursuit of intention. Neither does it occur in a merely 
spontaneous way, “but are due to an effort to actualise certain hidden 
potentialities; and the uncaused action that releases, and so also evokes them, is 
not a physical event but an imaginative thrust toward such a discovery.”72 The 
choices are taken by relying on particulars as clues to the solution of a problem, 
that is towards a discovery. 
From this fact Polanyi underlines an important distinction of human 
commitment, that is as a responsible commitment. It is this aspect that plays an 
important role in human greatness and which guides his calling to the 
universality of knowing. 
 
The Greatness of Human Being 
The presence of human kind in the universe assigns a noteworthy step on 
the comprehension of the meaningful world. With the rise of man a new horizon 
of meaning appears and is ready to be explored. The field of the meaning to be 
appreciated is ever enlarged and deepened, and the way the appreciation takes 
place is of a new sort. Biological need and perceptive stimuli are no more the 
limits of his endeavour of struggle, and the relatively spontaneous response to 
the circumstances is now extended to a more organised and more 
institutionalised project in order to transmit what has been achieved to the next 
generation as  we can see in science. 
Understanding human beings within the context of a many–level world can 
be helped by understanding the process of evolution. In the last chapter of his 
Personal Knowledge, Polanyi confronts the question of how the hierarchy of 
levels could come into existence and how it could be understood in the light of 
                                                 
70See Meaning, 177. 
71Polanyi uses the model of quantum mechanics in understanding the process of 
discovery in human thought. “The notion of gradient sloping in the direction of the 
minimization of potential energy, as we have spelled it out above, can also be used as a 
model for describing the efforts of human thought.” (Meaning, 176). 
72Meaning, 176. 
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what we know about evolution. The same attention is given in Meaning, in 
Knowing and Being, and in The Tacit Dimension. He absorbs the theory of 
evolution, but not in the way Charles Darwin explains it. Indeed, there is a 
reason why he is eager to revise the idea of evolution. Darwinism, Polanyi tends 
to say, cannot allow for the idea of a hierarchy of levels of reality, and as a 
consequence fails to bring light to the right place of human beings in the 
universe. 
 
Polanyi’s Critics on Darwinism 
The reaction to the theory of organic evolution proposed by Darwin was of 
different sort and reason. Those who accept the theory consider it as an 
important development of science especially in explaining the enigma of living 
beings. When On the Origin of Species was published for the first time on Nov. 
24, 1859 all editions were sold out immediately, and by 1872 the work had run 
through six editions. That means the theory has gained a very large interest. The 
opposition to this novelty was led mostly by religious based objections. Indeed, 
the theory of modification of species within the process of evolution has raised 
a serious question on the biblical narrative about creation; that God has created 
distinct species of living things.  It is even more provocative for those who hold 
a literal interpretation of the book of Genesis.73 
The approach launched by Polanyi to the problem of evolution is of a 
different sort. He admits some true elements in the theory, but he opposes the 
very basic assumption of the theory of Darwin about the nature of reality. 
Darwin’s theory of evolution offers a conclusion of one single level of reality, 
and hence looses sight of reality with which the theory deals.74 If the struggle 
for existence or the natural selection is the only factor that can convincingly 
justify the varieties of species, then we have to admit that all living beings that 
continue to survive have the same value. They are all the winners, and there is 
no other category we can apply to them regarding their position to each other, 
except that those which are becoming extinct lack the selective advantage. 
This, of course, is not the way we deal with reality. In the context of natural 
                                                 
73Fredrick Copleston writes about this: “Unless perhaps we happen to live in one of 
the few surviving pockets of fundamentalism, it is difficult for us now to appreciate the 
ferment which was caused in the last century by the hypothesis of organic evolution, 
particularly in its application to man. For one thing, the idea of evolution is now 
common coin and is taken for granted by every many people who would be quite unable 
either to mention or to weigh the evidence adduced in its favour. For another thing, the 
hypothesis is no longer an occasion for bitter theological controversy. Even those who 
question the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the evolution of human body from 
some other species commonly recognize that the first chapters of Genesis were not 
intended to solve scientific problems, and that the matter is one which has to be settled 
according to the available empirical evidence.” (F. COPLESTON, A History of 
Philosophy, III, New York 1993, 103.) 
74The Tacit Dimension, 46. 
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selection, man has a bad position today. His survival on earth seems less 
probable than that of the insects.75 Nonetheless, our interest of how insects 
come into existence has never exceeded the same attitude we have with 
humankind. Indeed, the history and ethology of insects has never turned our 
interest from human history, from literature and art. We are concerned with 
reality in certain ways according to its appropriate level. These facts, however, 
seem to be ignored in the name of scientific approach. “It is the height of 
intellectual perversion,” he writes, “to renounce, in the name of scientific 
objectivity, our position as the highest form of life on earth, and our advent by a 
process of evolution as the most important problem of evolution.”76 
We have seen previously how Polanyi shows the operation of new principle 
in the rise of life regarding the laws of physics and chemistry. Such an 
involvement of the new principle is, for him, a product of evolution. Polanyi’s 
idea of life is close to that of Henry Bergson conceiving it as a real whole, as an 
indivisible continuity that cannot be isolated in mechanism of parts. Evolution 
must be understood as the rise of an ever higher level of reality irreducible to 
the lower on which it relies for its operation. We can recognise then a strictly 
defined progression, rising from the inanimate level to ever higher additional 
principles of life.77 
Living beings can be divided in different levels. Polanyi suggests a gradual 
steps of operation, from plant to human being, each of them leaves a boundary 
open for the operation of the next higher level.78  Accordingly, we see the 
vegetative functions sustaining life at its lowest level while leaving open the 
higher functions of growth as well as the operations of muscular actions. On the 
next level, the laws governing the muscular actions leaves open the integration 
of such actions to innate patterns of behaviour. These patterns, on the next 
higher level, are shaped by intelligence leaving open a still higher principles of 
a responsible choice. 
It is difficult, of course, to establish precisely the skip from one level to the 
next. In some cases we see a very slight difference between living beings of 
different levels. We admire, for example, the presence of intellectual ability, 
akin to that of human beings, performed by other animals. Similarly, the 
development of embryo and  the growing of a child show the same variation. 
Nevertheless, this does not mean that the higher can be reduced to the lower. On 
                                                 
75A quite similar position is posed by Alfred Whitehead in his criticism of the 
theory of Darwin. He argues that if the only aim of living was no more than to maintain 
life, than the aim is more secure in the non–living beings. Accordingly, it is absurd to 
suppose the presence of reason in human being only in terms of the surviving. For, if it 
was so, the aim should have been accomplished in the inorganic nature. A rock may 
“live” or last for eight thousand million years, in front of which the chance for surviving 
of any species in this world is absolutely unfortunate. (See E. PAZI, Il pensiero 
scientifico contemporaneo, Firenze 1950, 82). 
76The Tacit Dimention, 47. 
77Knowing and Being, 234. 
78See Knowing and Being, 234; See also Personal Knowledge, 387-388. 
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the contrary, in Polanyi’s view, it proves that the higher levels of life are present 
in earlier stages of evolution. “They may be present in traces long before they 
become prominent. Evolution may be seen then as a progressive intensification 
of the higher principles of life.” 79  This aspect has not been taken into 
consideration within the theory of evolution passionating only the selective 
advantage of random mutation assisted by the idea of one level of simple 
element of reality. 
In The Tacit Dimension Polanyi describes another tendency that leads to 
the misrepresentation of evolution. Evolution, in his observation, instead of 
being comprehended in its proper sense, has been replaced by the attention to 
the origin of species.80 In other words, evolution explains only how one species 
turns into another, but never how living species, and then species with powers 
of perception, and then human intelligence, arose for the first time.81 For that 
reason, he insists, “natural selection is concerned with populations; it plays no 
part in the evolution of a single human being.”82 Polanyi adds to the variation of 
species, as a result of accidental mutation and natural selection, the changing of 
type achieving new levels of existence, and reveals with it a principle superior 
to mere adaptation promoted by the natural selection.83 
The understanding of evolution offered by Polanyi is a criticism against 
modern science and the neo–Darwinism embedding metaphysical faith, that is, 
that science can and must explain all the phenomena of nature in terms of one 
hypothesis, and that a hypothesis of maximum simplicity, of maximum 
impersonality and objectivity. According to Marjorie Grene, as cited by Drusilla 
Scott, Neo–Darwinism  is logically simple. “There are just two things 
happening, chance, variations, and the elimination of the worst ones among 
them, and both these happenings are just plain facts, things that do or don’t 
happen, yes or no. Nature is like a vast computing machine.”84 Of course this 
position is, in Polanyi’s view, self–destructive. For if the mind is simply the 
product of natural selection its conclusions are not reliable. Polanyi, therefore, 
prefer to lay his idea of evolution on the assumption of a many–level and 
meaningful world. 
                                                 
79Knowing and Being, 234. 
80The Tacit Dimension, 47. 
81Richard Allen notes this in his account of Polanyi’s posisition toward Darwinism. 
See R. ALLEN, Polanyi. Thinker of Our Time, London 1990, 67. 
82The Tacit Dimension, 47. 
83Personal Knowledge, 385 
84Drusilla Scott uses this citation in his account in order to show the similarity of 
view offered by Polanyi and Marjorie Grene regarding the concept of evolution of 
Darwin inherited by the neo–Darwinism. He writes: “Marjorie Grene and Polanyi both 
explore the lines in modern biological work that seem to lead to a more open theory 
than Darwinism, one that could allow for the emergence of higher levels of being only 
to be understood as real wholes. Such a theory would be part of a philosophy of life, 
which Darwinism cannot be.” (D. SCOTT, Michael Polanyi, 125). 
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The manifestation of human consciousness is a remarkable indication of an 
innovating principle operating in the process of evolution especially in the rise 
of human beings.85 Again he writes by precizing his argument on the phenomen 
of consciousness and the responsibility possessed by the human race. These 
aspects, he insists, are inexplicable in terms of mechanistic outlook claimed by 
Darwinism.86 
 
Human Destiny 
Human being then occupies a special place within the hierarchy of reality. 
He is, in fact, the most precious fruit of creation. This superior quality manifest 
in his moral sense and in his free and responsible choice. This quality, however, 
is accompanied by the risk of failing. The special place of human being 
manifests also in his universal intent enabling him to transcend his subjective 
interests. According to Polanyi the products of the creativity of thought can be 
better understood in the context of the universal intent, through which human 
being transcends his individuality. 
 
Superiority and Liabilities 
The presence of the human race in the grandstand of history has given a 
distinctive step to the process of evolution as a continuous process. While 
possessing all the capacities possessed by the lower level, human beings have 
more. He has more possibilities including the superiority on one side, and the 
possibility of failing on the other. They are the consequences of the law of a 
many–level world, that is that the series of increasingly comprehensive 
operations which lead up to the emergence of man is accompanied at every step 
by an additional liability to miscarry. A human being, therefore, has these 
aspects more than his lower companions.87 
A Human being, within this perspective, is facing a risky existence. His 
capacity to choose a right direction is accompanied by the possibility to do the 
opposite. He is free and feels responsible, and at the same time he is able to 
neglect his responsibility. They are all the possibilities absent in the animal life, 
let alone at the vegetative level. According to St. Thomas Aquinas the 
possibility of committing evil is a consequence of the freedom of human being, 
and that this possibility cannot be eliminated without eliminating a lot of the 
possibility of benefits. 88  Aquinas presented this argument to show that the 
presence of evil in the plurality of gradation of things does not contradict the 
goodness of Divine Providence. Polanyi asserts that the moral sense possessed 
by a human being cannot be separated from the possibility to choose another 
direction. 
                                                 
85Personal Knowledge, 386-387. 
86Personal Knowledge, 390. 
87The Tacit Dimension, 50 
88See S. THOMAS, Summa Contra Gentiles, Lib. III, Cap. 73, 4. 
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Indeed, the superiority of the human race in the hierarchy of living beings 
can be seen in different manifestations. In The Study of Man, Polanyi describes 
this peculiarity and calls human beings, in virtue of them, the peak of creation,89 
and in Personal Knowledge, the most precious fruit of creation.90 Indeed, we 
experience the greatness of fellow men more than other living beings. 91 
Accordingly, the achievement of man’s evolution exceeds any other living 
beings.92 
Such a supreme status, which demands our respect, is possessed by the 
whole humanity in virtue of his moral sense. Even when this moral sense seems 
to be absent, its mere possibility is sufficient to demand our respect. With the 
rise of man, Polanyi holds, evolution has arrived at one point where the 
domination of self–preservation is enriched with and expanded to a moral sense. 
A pure self–seeking prevailing for five hundred million years is now directed to 
a higher demands, to a peculiarly human relation to other men, that is to feel 
reverence for men greater than oneself. Such a capacity to feel the higher 
obligation, in Polanyi’s view, is the manifestation of human greatness. For, as 
he writes at the end of The Tacit Dimension, “if evolution is to include the rise 
of man, with all his sense of higher obligations, it must include also the rise of 
human greatness.”93 
 
Universal Intent 
The destiny of man is, of course, evident in the expansion of personhood 
possessed by the lower animal to the threshold of true mental life. Polanyi 
follows the description of Teilhard de Chardin about the ascent of the ultimate 
evolutionary step, called noogenesis, by which human knowledge was born. 
This step is achieved by a human being by creating for him a meaningful 
integration of realities such as the formation of a society and the invention of 
language in virtue of which he is permitted to create a lasting articulate 
framework of thought. This is the world created by man called by Teilhard de 
Chardin—and Michael Polanyi agrees with him—the noosphere.94  It is the 
cultural stratum in which a human mind lives on this planet. 95  Polanyi 
underlines the important role of this new sphere in giving a mark to the presence 
of man.96 
                                                 
89See The Study of Man, 43.46 
90See Personal Knowledge, 385. 
91The Tacit Dimension, 51. 
92Personal Knowledge, 385-386. 
93The Tacit Dimension, 52. 
94 Polanyi applies the terminology ‘personhood’ to organism equiped with a 
nervous system enabling it to carry out operations of self–control. (See Personal 
Knowledge, 388) 
95See The Study of Man, 60. 
96See Personal Knowledge, 393. 
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Every single human being, since his coming into existence, is installed to 
and achieves a responsible  personhood by entering a traditional noosphere. We 
are then born as members and, at the same time, creators of the noosphere. Our 
race as a whole achieved such personhood by creating its own noosphere: the 
only noosphere in the world. 
Indeed, the achievement of noosphere is another step toward a meaningful 
world. It is the second major rebellion against meaningless inanimate being. 
The first leap has taken place with the rise of living things equipped with 
self–centred individual, and yet lacking the awareness of the rationality of their 
performances. There was a long period of struggle and evolution until, at last, a 
new horizon was opened. Now the self–centred individual was accompanied by 
the noogenesis creating a new fabric of life not centred on individuals. When 
life is no more centred on the individual, Polanyi emphasises, then the natural 
death of the individual is transcended. The function of man’s body, in this 
respect, ceases to be merely an instrument of self–indulgence and becomes a 
condition of his calling in the framework of a universal intent and eternity. 
This dynamism is a momentous emergence that can be comprehended only 
within the framework of a hierarchy of reality. The rising of human 
consciousness is the key for its comprehension, for, looking at its activity, we 
know that it must not be reduced to merely material elements of our body. It is 
in accordance with the formula that, according to Polanyi, a comprehensive 
entity cannot be wholly explained in terms of its particulars. Yet the particulars 
constitute the condition for the entity above it, by leaving a boundary open for 
the operation of successive higher level. Accordingly, human consciousness, 
although it arises and dwells in the body—that there is, as Teilhard de Chardin 
describes, so little separable anatomically from the anthropoids—it, 
nevertheless, transcends human anatomy. 
The transcendence of consciousness to the body is evident in the difference 
between thoughts and the neural process which for some are merely the 
question of the using of different languages. Polanyi, however, shows that they 
are ontologically two different things. “We speak of the thoughts Shakespeare 
had while writing his plays,” he asserts, “and not of the thoughts of 
hydrochloric acid dissolving zinc, because men think and acids don’t.” 97 
Therefore there is no doubt, following Polanyi’s analysis, to accept the human 
position as the most precious fruit of evolution that cannot be totally elucidated 
by physics and chemistry. The special position of man in that process can be 
seen in the fact that the terrestrial life has waiting for a long time until the rise 
of man that bears thought in the universe.98 
 
                                                 
97Personal Knowledge, 389-390. 
98The Study of Man, 69-70; See also Personal Knowledge, 390. 
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Recognition of Metaphysical Reality 
While the positivists turn their focus on observable data and verifiable 
statements, Michael Polanyi makes clear the indispensability of metaphysical 
faith playing an important role in our activity of knowledge. Scientists, in using 
their statements, cannot exclude themselves from such a basic conviction. 
Metaphysical reality, being intangible, is often condemned as unreal and 
regarded to be merely epiphenomenal or illusory. In Polanyi’s idea of reality, 
however, this kind of isolation cannot be accepted. Relying on his idea of the 
hierarchy of reality, he finds that reality has to be comprehended in different 
gradations, from the lower to the higher. When the noogenesis started its first 
flame a new level of reality was ready to come into existence. It eventually 
presents us with two kinds of reality, namely the realities or integrations 
forming the noosphere and those existing prior to the noosphere. Both are real, 
Polanyi holds, and there is not sufficient explanation of claiming the first as less 
real and the latter as more. 
 
Redefining Reality 
In order to understand the meaning of reality according to Michael Polanyi, 
it will be helpful to bear in mind his idea  of the structure of tacit knowing in its 
correspondence with the structure of its object.99 In other words knowing has 
the same structure with the reality as its object. 
The relation between particulars to their comprehensive meaning brings us 
back to the idea of the emergence which produces an ever higher level of reality 
by controlling the marginal conditions left indeterminate by the principles 
governing the lower one. We have seen such an emergence forming different 
levels starting from inanimate to living things; from biotic level to the rise of 
human consciousness and the building of the noosphere. In Polanyi’s view the 
rising of a higher level is a manifestation of potential meaning as aspect of 
reality. They are all real and there is no reason to claim the tangibility as the 
criteria of reality. The higher levels are less tangible and for that reason tend to 
be considered as less real and have to be explained in terms of the tangible. This 
should not be the way we understand reality, Polanyi suggests. Reality must be 
approved by its potential meaning, that is, that it has some nature of its own into 
which we may penetrate further. Within this perspective we understand why 
person and problem have to be considered as more real than a cobblestone. 100 
To trust that a thing we know is real is, in this sense, to feel that it has the 
independence and power for manifesting itself in yet unthought of ways in the 
future. 
Obviously, this is a direct opposition against the modern scientific 
conviction which holds the tangibility as the main criteria of reality. According 
to Polanyi, there are realities, and even more real, which are not tangible. Mind 
                                                 
99The Tacit Dimension, 33-34. 
100The Tacit Dimension, 32. 
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is real. Problem is real; and man’s skilful exercise of his body is real entity too. 
We know them only with an intensive participation by relying on particulars as 
clues to their focal whole. If we move to a deeper or more comprehensive 
understanding of human being, we tend to pass from more tangible particulars 
to increasingly intangible entities: to entities which are more real; more real, 
that is, in terms of Polanyi’s definition of reality, as likely to show up in a wider 
range of indefinite future of manifestation. 101  Science assumes this fact 
although most of scientists will not acknowledge it for the sake of objectivity. 
In Polanyi’s view, however, it is this conviction that guides scientists to go on 
to discover further knowledge which is unknown and inconceivable today. 
Within this perspective, discovery is a manifestation of the hidden aspect of 
reality guided and prompted by our intimation with them. 
This definition embraces much more extensive contents than is held by 
positivistic view. Consequently Polanyi reminds us to extends our idea of 
reality to the unidentified territory that is not tangible. This project, Polanyi 
admits, means the restating an ancient metaphysical notion in new terms guided 
by gestalt psychology.102 Polanyi demonstrates that knowledge may include far 
more than we can tell. This theory corresponds to his idea of reality, and that 
this idea of knowledge can only be apprehended within this idea of reality. 
 
Metaphysical Reality 
Within the new understanding of the reality an acceptance of a 
metaphysical reality is now possible. If the tangibility is not the criteria of a 
reality to which our knowledge corresponds, then the basic argument of the 
positivistic skepticism has to be revised. Reality is more than those we can 
touch, observe and measure. Accordingly knowledge cannot be confined to 
things possessing those criteria. Its scope must reach also the metaphysical 
reality. 
In Polanyi’s thought metaphysical reality, includes all the targets of our 
ideal statements, such as truth, justice and morality. They are all realities that 
cannot be reduced, as done by the current science, to physics and chemistry, and 
ultimately to forces acting between atomic particles. It is for the sake of this 
idea that Polanyi writes: “We need a theory of knowledge which shows up the 
fallacy of positivistic skepticism and supports the possibility of knowledge of 
entities governed by higher principles.”103 The metaphysical reality then has to 
be seen in the framework of the emergence of the higher entity from the lower 
one that brings us to the rising of a living thing capable of pursuing the 
universal intent and feeling responsible. 
There is no doubt that Polanyi’s effort to show the validity of the claim of 
                                                 
101See Meaning, 168; and in Science, Faith and Society, 10, Polanyi writes: “Real 
is that which is expected to reveal itself indeterminately in the future.” 
102
“The Unaccountable Element in Science”, Philosophy. The Journal of the Royal 
Institute of Philosophy, 37/139 (Jan. 1962) 13. 
103Meaning, 25. 
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metaphysical reality, and hence the validity of metaphysical belief, is motivated 
by his observation of how such a claim effects the idea of human being and our 
respect for it. Polanyi believes that the refutation of the metaphysical reality in 
favour of holding the positivistic skepticism has created and is still creating 
human suffering.104 
There is another defect of discrediting the metaphysical belief. It is hold 
that the existence of a society, a free society, can be maintained only if the 
members of the society hold spiritual objectives such as truth, justice, and 
beauty.105 The freedom claimed in society is based on a mutual recognition 
between the members holding the society. Only if the members of the 
community submit to universal truth can they claim equality and freedom. 
Polanyi however does not lay his theory of the metaphysical reality merely 
on its implication to the humanity and social life. He shows also that denying it 
means acknowledging it in another way. Many times he asserts that the method 
of disbelieving of any proposition which cannot be verified will at last destroy 
the whole base of human knowledge. Ironically, the admiration of this method 
is triggered by the ambition for a freedom of thought. The result, however, is 
opposite, for it gains only the destruction of its grounds. “And it would destroy, 
in fact,” Polanyi writes, “belief in truth in the love of truth itself which is the 
condition of freedom of thought. The method leads to complete metaphysical 
nihilism and thus denies the basis for any universal significant manifestation of 
the human mind.” 106  For what reason, then, can we claim the freedom of 
thought if thought is no more than the result of the interaction of atoms? 
The acknowledgement of the metaphysical reality is the condition of our 
claiming of reality even of our striving to deny it. Polanyi is not reluctant to use 
the classic statement to express his position. “The denial of all spiritual reality is 
not only false but incapable of consummation. It is logically false to deny the 
existence of truth since the very statement asserting this is based on the 
assumption that truth can be established.”107 One may thinks this expression is 
only a clever use of eloquence. For Polanyi, however, it is not so. How can we 
accuse an expression launched against our position as only a clever use of 
eloquence if we do not believe in the truth of the position we are going to 
defend? So, belief in metaphysical reality is intrinsic to our claim of knowledge. 
If we do not accept its presence in an explicit way, we do it implicitly. 
 
Conclusion 
There are various tendencies which ambitiously present reality as simple as 
possible. Their effort is to explain everything within a formula that can be 
analysed and checked by a formal and explicit procedure. Such is the position of 
empiricism, materialism, and positivism. They hold that the only things which 
                                                 
104Meaning, 25. 
105Science, Faith and Society, 79. 
106Science, Faith and Society, 76. 
107Science, Faith and Society, 76. 
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can be accepted as real are those capable of being tested, hence it must be 
tangible and measurable. According to this position, there is only one level of 
reality. Within the idea of one–level reality there is no chance to recognise the 
rising of a higher principle harnessing the lower one which provides the 
boundary conditions. According to Polanyi, it is the root of all the 
misunderstanding of reality and man prevailing in our time. 
Polanyi, on the contrary, shows a hierarchy of reality. With the idea of a 
multi-level reality he tries to restore the idea of a meaningful world 
characterised with different levels of reality. Each level of existence is 
interesting in itself and consequently can be studied in itself. For him each level 
is real. A material thing is real, a living being is real, mind is real, and the 
creation of man is real too. There is no reason to claim the more tangible as 
more real, for real in Polanyi’s idea means something that can manifest itself 
indeterminately in the future. It is with this idea he defends the existence of 
metaphysical and spiritual reality which is indipensable for the respect of 
human dignity. 
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